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LOOKING AT OUR LANGUAGE: GLENDON 
ON RIGHTS 
James Boyd Wnite* 
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLmCAL DISCOURSE. 
By Mary Ann Glendon. New York: The Free Press. 1991. Pp. xvi, 
218. $22.95. 
In this most interesting book Mary Ann Glendon 1 takes as her 
subject the feature of American public discourse suggested in the title, 
namely that more than most nations we are likely to conceive of any 
issue that divides us in terms of a clash of rights, each stated abso-
lutely, with no apparent way to harmonize them. A familiar instance, 
addressed at some length by Glendon in an earlier book,2 is the abor-
tion issue, which is often debated in exactly such terms, one side 
speaking as if the fetus's "right to life," the other as if the woman's 
"right to control her body," had no limits. Of course, here as else-
where both sides in fact usually recognize some constraints: that abor-
tion is to be permitted after rape or to save the life of the mother, for 
example, or to be prohibited after some period of gestation. But this 
really supports Glendon's point: our talk of "rights" does not reflect 
what we know (or would concede) and thus both emphasizes the dif-
ferences among us and makes them seem unbridgeable. Suppose, by 
contrast, we habitually acknowledged the limits on the rights we as-
serted, and hence made salient the matters on which we agreed: the 
differences between the two positions would seem less stark and more 
amenable to compromise. We would be beginning a conversation that 
was more complex and multivalent than a simple clash of assertions. 
"Rights talk" of an absolutist and aggressive kind occurs not only 
in the law but in political debate more generally, indeed in school and 
family life and throughout our society. It is a general feature of our 
culture. Glendon tells us, for example, that in her adopted daughter's 
naturalization proceedings she was given a pamphlet explaining "The 
Meaning of American Citizenship" in these terms: "When you took 
the oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, you 
• Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English, Adjunct Professor of Classical Stud-
ies, University of Michigan. A.B. 1960, Amherst College; A.M. 1961, LL.B. 1964, Harvard. -
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1. Professor of Law, Harvard University. 
2. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987); see also 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABsOLUTES (1990); Michael W. McConnell, 
How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1991) (re-
viewing TRIBE, supra). 
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claimed for yourself the God-given unalienable rights which that sa-
cred document sets forth as the natural right of all men" (p. 12). By 
contrast, when Jane Jacobs became a citizen of Canada she was told 
by the judge that "the most important thing about being a Canadian is 
learning to get along well with one's neighbors" (p. 13). 
As an example of the sort of confusion into which our talk about 
rights can lead, Glendon tells of the American Legion spokesman who 
explained why the Supreme Court decision that protected the burning 
of the flag was wrong: "The flag is the symbol of our country, the land 
of the free and the home of the brave" (p. 8). When pressed as to 
exactly what this meant, he said, "It stands for the fact that this is a 
country where we have the right to do what we want" (p. 8) - except, 
of course, burning the flag. A spokesman for the flag-burner used sim-
ilar language: "The way I see it, I buy a flag. It's my property. So I 
have a right to do anything I want with it" (p. 8). 
Glendon is thus asking us to think not only about the way we talk 
in the law, but about the way we talk in our society more generally, 
and about the relation between these two fields of discourse. In this 
she functions not only as a legal analyst but as a sociologist of a certain 
appealingly old-fashioned kind, and her capacity to demonstrate how 
this kind of double analysis, which is far too rare, can be performed 
and performed well is one of the great virtues of her book. 
Substantively, Glendon's claim is not that we should never talk 
about rights, but rather that our particular discourse about rights, in 
the law and out of it, or what she sometimes calls our "rights dialect," 
has features which make it a very poor vehicle for thought and argu-
ment: "It is set apart from rights discourse in other liberal democra-
cies by its starkness and simplicity, its prodigality in bestowing the 
rights label, its legalistic character, its exaggerated absoluteness, its 
hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect to per-
sonal, civic, and collective responsibilities" (p. x). She argues not for 
the elimination or reduction of our rights discourse, but for what she 
calls its renewal and transformation. 3 
I 
Having defined her problem in general terms, Professor Glendon's 
3. A fuller statement of her position is this: 
Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social 
conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least 
the discovery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to con· 
done acceptance of the benefits of living in a democratic social welfare state, without ac-
cepting the corresponding personal and civic obligations. In its relentless individualism, it 
fosters a climate that is inhospitable to society's losers, and that systematically disadvan· 
tages caretakers and dependents, young and old. In its neglect of civil society, it undermines 
the principal seedbeds of civic and personal virtue. In its insularity, it shuts out potentially 
important aids to the process of self-correcting learning. 
P. 14. 
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first step is to try to explain how this particular discourse arose and 
came to have the configuration that it does. Her story begins with 
John Locke's use of an expanded conception of "property" as the 
model for rights that individuals have against each other and the gov-
ernment, a conception that was cheerfully adopted by Blackstone, who 
was himself phenomenally influential in shaping the rhetoric of early 
American law (pp. 23-24). Property rights themselves are of course 
far from absolute, and Glendon takes pains to outline the process by 
which the government has come to claim more and more power over 
real property. But it is nonetheless true that our talk about "property" 
has an aura of absoluteness: in ordinary discourse the phrase That's 
my property implies total dominion, and in law it implies at least a 
presumptive claim to be free to do what you want with it. Another 
characteristic of property language, at least among us, is that it 
imagines a host of individuals, each with his or her property, atomisti-
cally arrayed against each other and the state. This, as Glendon 
points out at greater length later on, makes it very difficult to reflect 
communal or social interests in this way of talking - for example 
those at stake when the city of Detroit used its right of eminent do-
main to displace the entire section of the city known as Poletown in 
order to make room for a General Motors factory.4 
Against Locke, she poses Rousseau's far more limited vision of the 
rights of property, namely "that an owner is a kind of trustee or stew-
ard for the public good" (p. 34). It is partly the influence of Rousseau, 
she thinks, that explains the differing European style in these matters, 
which is to articulate rights in far less absolute form. The West Ger-
man basic law of 1949, for example, provides: "Property and the right 
of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be deter-
mined by law."5 It goes on to make the limitations even more explicit: 
"Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal."6 
This is a very different way of talking about property from our own, 
really serving more to express a set of values or attitudes than to define 
what we would call a "right." 
Glendon shows how property conceptions have shaped other 
rights by giving a brief history of the right of privacy, which com-
menced as an analogue to property. Indeed its first constitutional uses 
seem to have been in Fourth Amendment cases, which were heavily 
dependent on a language ofproperty.7 After a brief period under Gris-
4. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 465-71 (Mich. 
1981) (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting) (recounting the history of the Poletown controversy). 
5. P. 39 (citing THE BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 20 (1981)). 
6. Id. 
7. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616 (1886). In fact, as she also suggests, property law originally served functions we think of 
today under a "privacy" label. For further discussion see JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS 
TRANSLATION 204-07 (1990). 
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wold v. Connecticut, 8 during which the Court talked about privacy as 
an aspect of the marital union - that is, as a relational right - it 
quickly became a "full-fledged individual right" (p. 57). The ultimate 
result was the declaration, rather ex cathedra, of the quasi-legislative 
rules in Roe v. Wade, 9 an exercise that has not satisfied many critics. 
But Glendon focuses less on the arguably improper form of these 
rules, and on the reasoning supporting them, than on their context in 
the larger social and legal matrix in which they function. When the 
same question arose in West Germany, the court produced a result 
that was far less absolutist in tone; equally important, its decision was 
supported by legislation that provided important services, including 
"medical care in pregnancy and childbirth and generous social assist-
ance to single mothers, as well as a highly efficient system of imposi-
tion and collection of child support" (p. 65). In our country today, by 
contrast, "poor, pregnant women ... have their constitutional right to 
privacy and little else. Meager social support for maternity and child-
raising, and the absence of public funding for abortions in many juris-
dictions, do in fact leave such women largely isolated in their privacy" 
(p. 65). This is a consequence, in part, of our habit of thinking of 
rights in the absolute and atomistic way that we do. 
The effects are systemic and work against the very values we seek 
to promote: "By exalting autonomy to the degree we do, we systemat-
ically slight the very young, the severely ill or disabled, the frail and 
the elderly, as well as those who care for them - and impair their own 
ability to be free and independent in so doing" (p. 74). 
Not only do we tend to see rights as isolated from the social and 
economic context in which they exist, we often regard the individual 
person as isolated in another way as well, from responsibility for his or 
her fellows. Glendon's example here is the well-known common law 
refusal to impose a duty to rescue strangers, a duty with which the 
Europeans are comfortable. But this is an issue not only between pri-
vate citizens, but also between public officials and the public: Has a 
police officer or firefighter a duty to act to help a person in danger? 
Has a social worker a duty to protect a child whom he knows is sub-
ject to systematic parental beatings? In Jackson v. City of Joliet, 10 the 
first question, and in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of 
Social Services, 11 the second was answered in the negative, at least as a 
matter of constitutional law. Glendon's point is not that either case 
was necessarily wrong, but that the language in which the Court in 
DeShaney spoke could 
easily sound like an endorsement of an image of government that the 
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
9. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10. 465 U.S. 1049 (1984). 
11. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
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United States decisively repudiated in the 1930s. Though we as a nation 
are committed in principle and in fact (if not to the same degree as other 
liberal democracies) to the education of the young, the protection of pub-
lic health and safety, and assistance to the needy, the Court's language 
might suggest otherwise. [The Court's opinion] all too readily lends it-
self to the interpretation that we are (in the Court's view) a nation of 
strangers - a nation that in principle leaves the helpless to their own 
devices. [p. 95] 
The danger is that this kind of opinion will misinform the public about 
the nature of its government and the obligations that support it. 
"[T]echnically proper legal negations of responsibility can easily mis-
educate the public about what it means to be a citizen. Careless judi-
cial pronouncements can harden the lines on a cultural grid which 
already seems to have decreasing room for a sense of public obliga-
tion" (p. 104). 
The absoluteness of our language of rights tends not only to erase 
the dimension of responsibility from our experience, but tends to erase 
the dimension of sociality as well. This means that we have a very 
weak language for the protection of what she calls "social environ-
ments - families, neighborhoods, workplace associations, and reli-
gious and other communities of obligation - that traditionally have 
provided us with our principal opportunities to observe, learn, and 
practice self-government as well as government of the self" (p. 120). 
This is a serious weakness on the part of our law, a failure to give an 
appreciative understanding to the importance of intermediate institu-
tions of social organization and collective life. 
II 
What keeps our rights discourse functioning in this way? There 
are many causes, but one of special interest to Glendon as a compara-
tive lawyer is our insularity from other systems. Glendon's example 
here is the relationship between Bowers v. Hardwick, 12 holding sodomy 
laws constitutional as applied to the conduct of consenting homosex-
ual adults, and the treatment of the same issue by the European Court 
of Human Rights. Not only was the European treatment less absolute 
and rigid - it condemned the particular prosecution, but held that 
some degree of regulation of private sexual conduct could be justified 
(p. 149) - the European case was argued and thought about with a 
consciousness of American experience, including American cases, 
while the American case was argued as though the European experi-
ence did not exist. To have attended to the European analogues, Glen-
don argues, would have provided a set of texts and arguments that 
might have led to opinions that respected more fully the complexity of 
the case they were deciding. 
12. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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Glendon's concern here is less with the result reached than with 
the mode of discourse by which that result is given meaning in the 
judicial opinions. In Bowers, the opinion for the majority simply as-
serted that the privacy doctrine of earlier cases applied only to family 
relationships, marriage, and procreative liberty, and did not extend "to 
cover all types of sexual conduct between consenting adults." 13 The 
opinion for the dissent is similarly abstract and absolute, asserting that 
the relationships in Bowers were indistinguishable from those gov-
erning earlier cases. Both opinions unnecessarily diminished views of 
those on the other side. 
The tone of the [majority] opinion must have been perceived by members 
of an already stigmatized group as legitimating, if not promoting, a cli-
mate of intolerance .... Similarly, even if one shares [the dissent's] view 
that Mr. Hardwick's individual rights should have prevailed, one may 
lament [its] disdainful brush-off of a community's interest in establishing 
and maintaining a cultural environment conducive to traditional moral 
standards. [p. 154] 
There is a kind of paradox here: it is the European courts that 
have become "proficient at the principled, modest, collegial, flexible, 
pragmatic techniques of judicial decision-making that were once the 
pride of the American common law" (p. 157), while the American 
courts have become more dogmatic. Part of the solution to the prob-
lem may be to attend, with respectful and serious attention, to courts 
that function in different ways from our own, in the hope that we may 
modify to some degree our own habits of mind. For Glendon, the 
stakes are very high indeed: "Rights talk in its current form has been 
the thin edge of a wedge that is turning American political discourse 
into a parody of itself and challenging the very notion that politics can 
be conducted through reasoned discussion and compromise" (p. 171). 
She has no ready solution to the problems she describes, except the 
only one that can work: a process of collective self-education to which 
this book is meant as a contribution. 
III 
What is one to think of this? To begin with, as I said above, it 
seems to me that the kind of work Professor Glendon is doing is of 
great importance in two respects: (1) the integration of the analysis of 
law with the analysis of the cultural and social context in which it 
occurs is all too rare, and her skill at doing it is most impressive; 
(2) likewise, her focus upon habits of thought and expression, rather 
than simply upon material consequences, is itself an important step in 
helping us achieve fuller self-understanding. Few things can equal in 
significance the nature and quality of the discourse by which we imag-
ine and talk about the world, and Glendon does us all a service to 
13. P. 151 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91). 
May 1992] Glendon on Rights 1273 
insist upon this matter. About her account of the history of "rights 
talk" I have rather little to say, since I do not know enough to judge 
that part of her book. Her characterization of our rights talk as abso-
lutist, irresponsible, insular, and the like, does seem to me mainly cor-
rect, and her examples are for the most part fine ones. My only real 
doubt is my sense that the story is still incompletely told. 
When I think of the Supreme Court cases decided in the past 
twenty or thirty years, for example, their characteristic vice seems to 
me less the assertion of absolute rights than the claim to judge every 
case by a process of "balancing" one cluster of interests off against 
another. This phenomenon has been well described and criticized, 
from different points of view, by Robert Nagel, in his book Constitu-
tional Cultures, 14 and by Alexander Aleinikoff.15 Such "balancing" 
might at first seem rather close to what Glendon recommends, but I 
think to say this would be a profound misreading of her work for two 
reasons: "balancing'' is likely to be overparticularized in practice, im-
peding rather than advancing the sort of general thought she encour-
ages; and "balancing" works by a process of abstracting from a 
complicated matrix certain elements, conceived of as discrete and sub-
ject to independent evaluation, in just the way that she complains 
rights discourse generally functions. Instead of large absolute rights, 
we have many mini-rights, called interests; the occlusion of responsi-
bility and sociality, and even the failure to contextualize in an appro-
priate way, may still be present. 
The real vice to which she may be pointing, then, is not so much 
"rights talk" itself as the features she describes it as having, which can 
also be features of other elements of our discourse: absoluteness, ag-
gressiveness, atomization, the erasure of institutions of civil society in-
termediate between the individual and the state, and so on. Perhaps 
the root of it is this last feature: seeing the legal actor as an individual 
without a human context, without age or gender or cultural location, 
but as an abstract bearer of certain rights or interests. This is the in-
heritance of the Enlightenment, and it is a feature of rights talk as it 
has developed; but it is a feature as well of interest-balancing and of 
the economic discourse of which that balancing is a shadow. These 
ways of talking tend to erase the significance not only of what Glendon 
calls institutions of civil society, but, beyond that, of human communi-
ties, families, and cultures. These too could have "rights," if we 
choose to think that way, and perhaps should-the right of Poletown 
to be considered as a community before it is destroyed, or the right of 
an ethnic group to be free from defamation. 
14. ROBERT NAGEL, CoNSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CoNSE-
QUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989). 
15. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943 (1987). 
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The other side of this coin is that, to my way of thinking at least, 
"rights talk" can sometimes be a very good thing indeed, including in 
its apparent absoluteness. The origins of the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule, for example, lay in a right of property Qimited as all 
property rights were by the police power), and this language captured 
a sense of the citizen as residual sovereign in a way that gave real force 
to this provision in the Bill of Rights. The shift to interest analysis, 
balancing state needs against individual rights, has led to a systematic 
erosion of individual power and autonomy. Similarly, the Miranda 
rules have been a great contribution, recognized as such even by many 
police departments and prosecutors, and I think an important part of 
their merit lies in their clarity, even their rigidity. 16 And many would 
say that the Free Speech Clause should be interpreted more absolutely, 
not less. 
If I am right that "interests talk" can have many of the vices of 
"rights talk," and that "rights talk" is sometimes a very good thing 
indeed, including when it is rather absolutist in tone, there is more to 
say about the character of our rights discourse than has yet been said. 
I do not mean so much to criticize Glendon, for she does what she sets 
out to do very well, as to suggest that she has marked out a path along 
which she, or others, may wish to go further. 
One difficulty with Glendon's analysis for me is that she tends to 
treat the law as a unit, in this revealing a European orientation. In our 
system it is mainly the courts that are responsible for the perpetuation 
of "rights talk." But this makes a good deal of sense, since they are 
thought to exist to adjudicate particular conflicts among individuals, 
or between individuals and the state, and not to provide systemic solu-
tions to social ills. As constitutional actors, in fact, their very task is 
to decide when the legislature has encroached too far upon the rights 
of citizens, and to do this without presuming to decide either of two 
very different questions, namely what the legislature ought to do 
within its proper sphere of government or the individual within hers. 
It would be improper for a court to try to think as globally about a 
social problem as the legislature can, or even to intimate its views on 
the legislature's exercise of its legitimate powers. And in adjudicating 
constitutional rights, the court is the servant not of the legislature, but 
of the Constitution, which does speak in terms of rights.17 In this 
16. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
17. Consider here once more the DeShaney and Joliet cases. The Court is not really address-
ing the issue of the duty of the public officers to serve the public, which is in the main a state law 
question, but the question of competence to decide these matters, which the Court locates in the 
state legislature or the state courts. Presumably the Court would have no quarrel with a state 
that worked in just the ways that Professor Glendon wished, within the sphere of power it has 
marked out. Professor Glendon knows this, of course, as she makes plain on pp. 94-95, whete 
she suggests ways in which the Court might temper the appearance its language might give to 
those not experienced in reading law. 
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sense the feature of our discourse to which she draws attention is in 
part produced by the particular separation of powers achieved by our 
Constitution, which has its own important merits. Her analysis would 
thus be more complete if it reflected the degree to which courts and 
legislators do, and should, talk differently from each other; though I 
can see why she has not pursued this distinction in her book, where 
she perfectly and properly paints with a very broad brush, trying to 
capture qualities of our political as well as our legal discourse. And I 
should add that her focus on the way that courts talk makes a great 
deal of sense in a society that converts so many issues that would in 
other countries be legislative in character into the material of the judi-
cial drama. 
Glendon has written a book about discourse: if it worked in the 
world exactly as she might wish, it would transform the discourse of 
others, especially judges, legislators, and politicians, who would re-
duce their commitment to the absoluteness, asociality, hyperindividu-
alism, and insularity of "rights talk" in favor of a discourse that was 
more complex and open. There would be a more adequate acknowl-
edgement of what can be said on the other side of a particular issue; an 
inclusion both of the immediate loser and of the powerless more gener-
ally in the social and intellectual universe; an insistence upon seeing 
the interconnectedness of one issue with many others; and, in the pro-
cess, a more fully civilized approach to law. Professor Glendon de-
fines her sense of what a more satisfactory form of discourse would be 
in three ways: by describing it in explicit terms; by giving examples, 
mainly from European courts; and, most important of all, by exempli-
fying it in her own prose. Here she defines herself as a person inter-
ested in social and cultural context, able to keep competing claims in 
mind and insistent upon addressing her reader as a sensible person 
with a multiplicity of identities and cultural roles. It is her own per-
formance in her writing that is in the end the best definition of and 
argument for the position she recommends. 
